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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine the causes and e®ects of State reg-
ulation that determines the extent of professional independence of advanced
practice nurses (APNs). We analyze determinants of these regulations in
panel data across States.
We ¯nd that in States where APNs have acquired a substantial amount
of professional independence, the earnings of APNs are substantially lower,
and those of physicians' assistants are substantially higher, than in other
States. These results are striking since physicians' assistants are in direct
competition with APNs; the only real operational di®erence between these
groups is that physicians' assistants are salaried employees who must work
under the supervision of a physician. The implication is that physicians have
responded to an increase in professional independence of APNs by hiring
fewer APNs and more physicians' assistants.
JEL classi¯cations: C15, C35, K31
Key words: regulation, professions, nursing
panel data, Markov Chain Monte Carlo.
iiThe purpose of this study is to examine the causes and e®ects of State
regulation that determines the extent of professional independence of ad-
vanced practice nurses. Such nurses include nurse practitioners, certi¯ed
nurse-midwives, clinical nurse specialists, and nurse anesthetists. Variations
in the boundaries of practice for these advanced practice nurses (APNs)
are of interest, since there is a considerable overlap between their health
care responsibilities and those of physicians. There is a great deal in com-
mon, in terms of functions and responsibilities, between nurse practitioners
and primary care physicians; between certi¯ed nurse-midwives and obste-
trician/gynecologists; and between nurse anesthetists and anesthesiologists.
We are interested in analyzing di®erences in the practice boundaries of APNs
across States, and changes over time within States. The objectives of this
study are to learn (1) the determinants of the extent of the restrictions im-
posed by a State on the practice of APNs, and (2) the consequences of such
restrictions for the earnings of APNs and other health care providers. We
do a cross-sectional and time series analysis of the factors that may be im-
portant in determining the regulatory outcome. This analysis is motivated
by the economic theory of regulation (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Graddy
1991), which models legislative choice as a response to the competing de-
mands of various interest groups, which o®er political support to legislators
in exchange for the outcomes they desire.
Professional independence of advanced practice nurses can be summa-
rized by State laws regarding two key issues: (1) the degree of any required
1physician supervision of APNs and (2) the extent to which APNs are li-
censed to write prescriptions. We construct two ordinal categorical variables
for these two facets of APN independence and estimate a bivariate ordered
probit model for a panel of States. Our model takes into account a par-
ticular dependence in the data: Across time, States have almost universally
moved towards allowing greater professional independence, rather than lesser
independence for APNs.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section de¯nes the relevant
professions and discusses their regulation, with reference to the literature.
The second section describes the data and the third section presents the
bivariate ordered probit model. The fourth section applies some of the re-
sults from the bivariate ordered probit to study the e®ects of regulation on
earnings. The ¯nal section concludes.
I. De¯nition and Regulation of Advanced Practice Nurses
Nurse Practitioners (NPs) are registered nurses whose formal education
and clinical training go well beyond the basic requirements for licensure.
Most NPs are trained in master's degree programs.3 NPs are trained to di-
agnose and treat common acute illnesses and injuries, manage high blood
3As of 1995, 80.9 percent of all students being trained to become NPs were enrolled in
M.A. programs. Harper and Johnson (1998).
2pressure, diabetes, and other chronic problems; prescribe drugs, devices and
treatments; order and interpret X-rays and other laboratory tests; and coun-
sel patients on disease prevention. The number of NPs in the U.S. is not
precisely known, since this occupation is not separately licensed but rather
certi¯ed, and there are several di®erent certifying organizations. Moreover
certi¯cation, although required in some States, is voluntary in most. As of
1992 estimates of the number of nurse practitioners in the U.S. ranged from
21,900 to 27,200 (Sekscenski, et al., 1994), which amounts to about 1.5 per
cent of registered nurses.4
Certi¯ed Nurse-Midwives (CNMs) are registered nurses with advanced
training in midwifery who have been certi¯ed through a national examina-
tion. They are trained to deliver babies, provide gynecological care, family
planning services, and pre- and post-natal care for mothers and infants. They
also co-manage with physicians those pregnancies that are considered to be
high-risk cases. CNMs are basically substitutes for obstetrician/gynecologists
and general practitioner physicians in the management of obstetrical and gy-
necological care. In 1992, there were between 3500 and 4300 certi¯ed nurse-
midwives in the U.S. (Sekscenski, et al., 1994).
Within the ranks of APNs, a distinction is often made between nurse prac-
titioners and certi¯ed nurse-midwives, on the one hand, and clinical nurse
4Morgan (1993) estimated the number of active NPs in 1992 to be 27,226, which was
1.25 percent of the estimated number of active RNs, 2.18 million. There has been remark-
able growth in the number of NPs since 1992, however. Industry surveys indicate that
there are about 55 thousand NPs in full-time practice (Pearson (2000, Table 3)).
3specialists and certi¯ed nurse anesthetists, on the other hand, in that the
former, but not the latter, are engaged in primary care. Clinical nurse spe-
cialists generally practice in tertiary care settings (Safriet 1992, at 423 n.)
Physician assistants (PAs) perform essentially the same tasks as NPs;
they provide preventive health services, diagnose illness, conduct physical ex-
aminations, order laboratory tests, develop and carry out plans for treatment,
consult and collaborate with, and refer cases to, other providers. PAs are
not nurses, however; they are mostly graduates of two-year medical training
programs. Although the services of PAs and NPs are largely interchangeable,
there are subtle di®erences between their practice characteristics. PAs who
work in primary care are typically generalists in the area of family practice.
NPs, on the other hand, are more likely to specialize in areas of primary
care such as family practice, adults, geriatrics, pediatrics, women's health,
neonatal care, or acute care. In addition, NPs are reported to place greater
emphasis on prevention and patient education. For the purposes of our study,
the most important di®erence between PAs and NPs is that PAs are salaried
employees who by law must work under the supervision of a physician. Also,
it is interesting to note that in contrast to NPs and other APNs, a large
proportion of PAs are male. The number of PAs in practice in 1992 was
estimated to be 22,300 (Sekscenski, et al., 1994).
A. Regulatory Stances across States
4There is considerable variation across the States in terms of restrictions
on the scope of practice of APNs. Direct limitations on practice generally
fall into either of two categories: (1) requirements of formal practice rela-
tionships with MDs, in the form of written practice agreements, protocols,
and collaboration guidelines; and (2) restrictions of practice to certain sites
or facilities, such as family planning clinics, or to certain geographical areas,
such as rural areas.
The most recent survey available reports that in sixteen States nurse
practitioners must be supervised by, or collaborate with, a physician (Pear-
son 1998). There is, however, an unmistakable trend toward granting more
autonomy to advanced practice nurses. In recent years, twenty-six States
have passed laws allowing nurse practitioners to work without a link to a
physician. Moreover, in July 1997 the U.S. Department of Veteran A®airs
decided to accept nurse practitioners without a practice relationship with
physicians.
Another area in which there are major di®erences among the States in
the extent of professional independence concerns the authority of APNs to
prescribe drugs, devices and treatments. There are substantial di®erences
across the States both in the extent of an APN's authority to prescribe and
in the range of drugs which they are allowed to prescribe. In fourteen States
the involvement or supervision of a physician is required, and APNs may not
prescribe controlled substances. Nineteen States require the involvement of
5a physician. In eighteen States, however, nurse practitioners are allowed to
prescribe without any physician involvement (Pearson 1998).
Another aspect of professional independence concerns compensation for
the services of the NP or CNM. Two principal issues are: (1) what will the
level of compensation be, relative to the amount paid when the same services
are provided by a physician; and (2) will payment be made directly to the
APN, or can she bill only through a physician? A rule that the APN may
be reimbursed only from a payment made to a physician naturally tends to
undermine the professional independence of the APN. For years there has
been direct reimbursement of nurse practitioners in certain practice settings.
NPs are directly reimbursed by many State Medicaid programs that serve
low-income individuals and by Medicare programs for patients in rural areas.
There is also a recent trend for managed-care organizations to provide direct
compensation to APNs. In January 1998 a new Federal statute allowed
Medicare to reimburse directly nurse practitioners working anywhere within
a State, not just in rural areas.5 This law will surely have an impact well
beyond Medicare, since private insurers and State insurance regulators tend
to adopt provisions patterned after federal Medicare arrangements.
B. The Literature on the Legal Environment for Advanced Practice Nurses
5Health-related provisions of P.L. 105-33, the Balanced Budget Act.
6Sekscenski et al. (1994) constructed \practice environment scores" de-
signed to measure the extent to which State laws were hospitable to the
professional independence of physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and
certi¯ed nurse-midwives. A separate score was constructed for the practice
environment of each of the three groups. It turned out that there was a
positive correlation across States between the supply of each group (i.e., the
ratio of practitioners to population) and the State's corresponding practice
environment score.6
Declerq et al. (1998) constructed a \support score" representing each
State's regulatory environment of certi¯ed nurse-midwives. The ratings were
based on ¯ve factors: (1) whether CNMs were members of the state board
that regulated them; (2) the extent of their prescriptive authority; (3) the
availability of reimbursement by Medicaid and private insurance companies;
(4) whether CNMs had hospital admitting privileges; and (5) whether CNMs
in free standing birth centers could be reimbursed. They found a high positive
correlation between a State's support score and the supply of CNMs (CNMs
per female population). Support scores were also positively associated with
median family income, hospital costs, physicians per capita and nurses per
capita.
In this study, we evaluate the relationship between determinants, such as
the number of physicians and nurses per capita, and measures of APN pro-
6This study con¯rmed the ¯ndings of Weston (1980). Sekscenski et al. also found a
positive correlation between the supply of generalist physicians and nurse practitioners.
7fessional independence in a structural econometric model. The next sections
discuss the data and the model.
II. The Data
For the years 1988-1996 we have constructed two ordinal categorical vari-
ables representing di®erent facets of the degree of professional independence
of APNs in a State: (1) AUTHORITY, which measures the extent to which
an APN must be supervised by, or collaborate with, a physician; and (2)
PRESCRIBE, which measures the extent to which an APN has license to
prescribe drugs. Each variable has levels 1 through 4, where the number in-
creases with the degree of professional autonomy. For AUTHORITY, 4 indi-
cates complete professional independence. For PRESCRIBE, level 4 indicates
that the APN can prescribe any drug, including controlled substances, with-
out any requirement that a physician be involved. Level 1 of PRESCRIBE
indicates that the involvement or supervision of a physician is required, and
that APNs may not under any circumstances prescribe controlled substances.
These variables, which are described in detail in Appendix 3, are based on
qualitative information about State laws and rankings reported in annual
issues of Nurse Practitioner.
One of our variables, the percentage of births with low birthweight, repre-
sents the general quality of health care within a State. The idea behind this
8variable is to explore whether a perception that health care is poor provides
the impetus to enact laws that allow APNs to practice independently. Paul
(1984) investigated whether the States that ¯rst required the licensure of
physicians were those with the lowest quality of health care, the idea being
that a State could improve its medical care through licensure of physicians.
However he found no such relationship.
III. The E®ects of Regulation on APN Earnings
A. The Literature on Earnings
We would like to examine the e®ect of regulation on the income of APNs,
primary care physicians, and physician assistants. Sass and Nichols (1996)
analyzed the impact of licensing statutes that limit the control of physicians
over physical therapists. Some States have enacted \direct access" laws,
which allow physical therapists to evaluate and treat patients without a re-
ferral from a physician. Sass and Nichols considered two competing hypothe-
ses about the e®ect of existing laws that require a physician referral. Under
the capture model of regulation, physicians simply seek to limit the access
of patients to those, such as physical therapists, who o®er an alternative to
the services of a physician. Under the public interest theory of regulation,
however, the requirement of a physician referral bene¯ts patients, who are
ill-informed and would make worse choices of therapists' services if there were
9no referral requirements. The study found that wages of physical therapists
were lower in the States with direct access laws, a result that was striking in
view of the vigorous lobbying e®orts on behalf of these laws by the physical
therapists' national association. Sass and Nichols suggested that direct ac-
cess laws might increase the supply or reduce the quality of physical therapy
services, by allowing the practice of lower quality therapists who would not
otherwise survive, since they would not receive referrals from a physician.
The question remains as to why the physical therapists' association would
work to enact laws that have the e®ect of reducing their wages. The authors
surmised that either (1) physical therapists mistakenly believed that the re-
moval of referral requirements would increase their incomes; or (2) physical
therapists were aware of the consequences of these laws for their wages, but
were willing to pay this price to gain professional independence.
Sass and Nichols made another point about physician incentives that is
directly relevant to the practice of APNs. It is not clear that under the cartel
theory physicians would want to minimize the use of physical therapy services
by patients. In many situations physicians may have an ownership interest
in, or otherwise derive a ¯nancial bene¯t from, the practice of therapists
to whom they refer patients. Given the asymmetry of information between
patient and physician, there may be a tendency in these situations for the
physician to over-prescribe the use of these services.
In a study of dental hygienists, Goldsmith (1989) considered the e®ect of
10State regulations that (1) speci¯ed the extent to which hygienists must be
supervised by dentists, and (2) restricted the range of tasks that could be
performed by hygienists. He assumed that the productivity of hygienists was
reduced by laws that required close supervision of them by dentists, and by
laws that restricted the scope of their activities. On the other hand, Gold-
smith noted, there might be a \compensating di®erential" for such laws to
the extent they made the occupation of a dental hygienist less attractive. In
the event he found that the e®ect of these laws on productivity was domi-
nant; the wages of hygienists declined the fewer the tasks they were allowed
to do, and the closer the supervision that was required by law.
B. The Earnings Data
To learn the e®ect of regulation on the earnings of APNs and other
providers, we use data from nine consecutive March Current Population Sur-
veys (CPS) for the survey years 1989 through 1997. The CPS is a large
random sample of the U.S. population, used to update the most recent de-
cennial census. It is one of the best available sources of current information
on income, work experience and other conditions of the labor market. The
CPS data provide information on earnings in the calendar year preceding the
March survey. For each year covered by the CPS, we extracted the statis-
tical records of all persons classi¯ed in any of three occupational categories:
11registered nurse, physician, and physicians' assistant. It should, however, be
understood that this is not designed to be a de¯nitive study of the deter-
minants of earnings of registered nurses and physicians. Other studies have
examined these issues more thoroughly, for example by controlling for the
specialties of physicians or the practice environment of nurses.7 Rather, our
purpose is to put the results for APNs in context by comparing the e®ects
of the variables of our data set on related health professions.
To analyze advanced practice nurses, we selected the records of all those in
the registered nurse occupation who had a master's or \professional school"
degree (but not a Ph.D.) or alternatively, at least ¯ve years of higher edu-
cation. In so doing our objective was to obtain as many APNs as possible,
without including RNs with advanced degrees who were in educational posi-
tions.8
Our analysis is restricted to the year-round, full-time workers of each
occupation, de¯ned as those working ¯fty or more weeks per year and thirty-
¯ve hours or more in a typical week. Earnings for all years are converted to
1997 dollars by the Consumer Price Index. All observations are weighted by
7Indeed, the regression results for physicians are based on the two years of our data
where there was no upper limit on reported earnings, 1995 and 1996.
8In 1996 there were about 207,459 registered nurses with a master's or doctoral degree.
This is about 9.8 per cent of the total number of RNs, estimated at 2,115,815. It is also
almost four times the total number of APNs, estimated to be 53,753 in 1996 (Division of
Nursing, 1996). The great majority of RNs with these advanced degrees are in educational
positions, and therefore fall under CPS occupational categories outside of our data set,
such as \health specialties teachers".
12the March supplement ¯nal weight provided with the CPS data.9 Experience
is measured by age minus years of schooling minus six. There are dummy
variables for race, sex, marital status and for nine regions of the country.
Other dummies indicate whether the worker is self-employed, employed by a
hospital, by the federal government, or by a state or local unit of government.
Historically there has been a wage premium for registered nurses who work
in hospitals. A number of reasons for this di®erential are provided in the
literature: hospital nurses are of higher quality, their work is more arduous,
they have more responsibility, and are more likely than other nurses to have
evening or weekend shifts. 10 There also seems to be a wage premium for NPs
who work in hospitals.11 Since a 1997 salary survey reported relatively low
salaries for NPs in college health clinics ($43,386 compared to an overall mean
of $52,532), we have included a variable indicating whether the industry of
the employer is education.
9It was appropriate to use this variable (MARSUPWT) rather than the earnings weight
(ERNLWT), which is speci¯cally constructed for application to hourly and usual weekly
earnings, but not for annual earnings (ERN-VAL). Telephone conversation with Dr. Gre-
gory D. Weyland, Bureau of the Census, September 11, 1998.
10See, e.g., Ventura (1997). Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) found that the wage pre-
mium for hospital employment was attributable partly to greater ability of hospital RNs
and partly to less pleasant working conditions. Lehrer, White and Young (1991) stated
that, in comparison with nurses in other practice settings, nurses in hospitals have more
responsibility, perform tasks that are more physically demanding, and are more likely to
have evening, night, weekend or overtime work. See also Mennemeyer and Gaumer (1983),
at 38, and Booton and Lane (1985), at 190.
11A 1997 survey reported a mean salary of $52,532 for all NPs, but substantially more
for those in two hospital settings: $60,050 for emergency departments and $60,208 for
surgical facilities (Leccese 1998). Moreover the mean salary for those in HMOs, most of
whom would be in hospitals, was $58,515.
13C. Earnings Regression Results
Table 3 shows the means of certain variables, to provide a comparison of
some characteristics of the sample distributions of RNs, APNs, physicians'
assistants, and physicians. Earnings of RNs are less than those of APNs but
greater than those of physicians' assistants. It is striking that 60 per cent of
physicians' assistants are male, compared to only 7 per cent of RNs and 9
per cent of APNs.
Results of the regressions on log earnings are set forth in Table 4. In the
earnings regressions we have used two alternative measures of PRESCRIBE,
which represents the extent of an APN's authority to prescribe drugs. One
measure is the continuous latent variable, y¤
2, that was produced as a by-
product of the Gibbs sampling for the ordered probit reported in this study.
Alternatively, we estimated the earnings regression with three dummy vari-
ables based on di®erent levels of PRESCRIBE. In general the results were
quite similar, but we note below where the results in Table 4 di®ered across
the two speci¯cations.12 In Table 4, the results from the continuous latent
12We do not include AUTHORITY in the earnings regressions, as it was generally
insigni¯cant. Legal independence of an advanced practice nurse does not have much
operational signi¯cance unless it is accompanied by the power to write prescriptions or
to receive direct reimbursement for services. Accordingly, when Sekscenski et al. (1994)
constructed \practice environment scores," a State could obtain a maximum of 20 points
if practitioners had legal status as professionals, 40 points if they were directly reimbursed
for their services, and 40 points if they had the authority to write prescriptions. They
noted that \more weight was given to the second and third categories because the simple
recognition of professional identity entailed in the conferring of legal status alone was
considered less important." Ibid. at 1267.
14variable are in column A, and those from the dummy variables are in column
B.
With respect to physician earnings, it should be noted that the CPS had
an upper limit on reported earnings of $100,000 during the years 1988-94. As
noted in Appendix 3, this limitation was not important for advanced practice
nurses, registered nurses or physicians' assistants, but was quite important
for physicians. Accordingly, for physicians we estimated a Tobit speci¯cation
in which reported incomes of $100,000 were considered censored.
Table 4 (page 3) shows that being self-employed has a large cost in fore-
gone earnings for RNs, and in one speci¯cation for APNs, but has a sub-
stantial bene¯t for physicians. The e®ect for nurses might be considered a
compensating di®erential for the privilege of professional independence or,
alternatively, it might re°ect the fact that physicians, hospitals and HMOs
who hire nurses tend to choose those of the highest quality from the available
pool.
Given the traditional allocation of household work, one would expect
the earnings of married males to exceed those of married females, ceteris
paribus; in addition, those of single females may exceed those of married
females, and those of married males may exceed those of single males. There
is, however, evidence that these di®erentials have eroded in recent years,
as the traditional division of household work has been revised. See, e.g.,
Rosen (1992), Blau, Ferber and Winkler (1998). Here, in the large sample of
15RNs we ¯nd that married females earn less than single females (the omitted
reference category), but this di®erential is reversed for physicians and APNs.
It is possible that a married couple departs substantially from the traditional
model when the cost of the woman's time is as high as it is for a physician. If
the division of work is approximately equal, the married female may actually
be able to bene¯t from economies of specialization of household tasks not
available to a single woman. Note also that there is a premium for being
male for APNs, physician's assistants, and physicians.
For the geographic variables, the omitted reference category is New Eng-
land. One generally expects earnings to be somewhat lower in the South,
and that holds true here for APNs, and generally for RNs, except that for
RNs earnings seem to be equally low in the North Central, i.e., Midwest-
ern States. Earnings tend to increase with population density.13 For APNs,
RNs and PAs, earnings were much larger in the two highest categories of
population density.
Most studies of nurses have found that the e®ect of experience on earnings
is statistically signi¯cant but relatively small.14 Here we ¯nd a signi¯cant
e®ect for RNs {between 1.6 and 1.8 percent per year{ which is much lower
than the 9.3 per cent e®ect found for physicians.
For RNs, there is a premium for hospital work, which may re°ect the
13Studies ¯nding a positive relationship between wages and population density for RNs
include Mennemeyer and Gaumer (1983), at 41, Link (1988), at 377, and Lehrer, White,
and Young (1991), at 368.
14See, e.g., Link (1988), at 377, and Mennemeyer and Gaumer (1983), at 41.
16demands of acute care nursing, but this variable has a negative e®ect for PAs.
Race is not signi¯cant for APNs or PAs, but there is a negative di®erential
of at least 10 percent for RNs who are Black.
What then is the e®ect on earnings of PRESCRIBE, i.e., of laws that grant
a higher degree of professional autonomy to APNs? The dummy variable for
level 3 of PRESCRIBE, the second highest level of authority to prescribe, has
a negative e®ect on the earnings of APNs, signi¯cant at the eight per cent
level. Moreover, in the speci¯cation that uses the continuous latent variable
for prescription privileges, a unit increase in this variable reduces earinings
by 19 percent. This e®ect is signi¯cant at a probability level of 0.002.
There is also an indication that an increase in the prescription privileges
of APNs increases the earnings of physicians' assistants, who might be viewed
as their competitors. Although the e®ect of the latent variable is small, levels
3 and 4 of PRESCRIBE in the dummy variable speci¯cations have a highly
signi¯cant positive e®ect on the earnings of physicians' assistants. Note that
there is no e®ect on the earnings of registered nurses or physicians.
The e®ect for APNs recalls the ¯nding of Sass and Nichols (1996) that
the wages of physical therapists are reduced by laws allowing them to treat
patients without a physician referral. We might then consider the possibility
that the reduction in wages found here is the result of an increase in supply,
from APNs who would not otherwise be in practice, since they would not be
hired by a physician. However, this would not explain the increase in earn-
17ings of the physicians' assistants. This e®ect would, however, be explained
if physicians substitute away from APNs and toward physicians' assistants,
in States that grant APNs a high level of professional independence. Physi-
cians who are employed by a hospital or HMO may be less inclined to hire
APNs if they believe that the organization that employs them would consider
shifting some of their functions to the APNs, whose time is substantially less
expensive. Moreover, physicians may be especially concerned about legal or
insurance arrangements whereby APNs receive their compensation directly
rather than through a supervising physician. Such arrangements are more
likely to arise, and to be anticipated by physicians, in States which have
taken a liberal position on the professional independence of APNs.
Goldsmith (1989) found that wages of dental hygienists were lower in
States where regulation reduced the range of tasks they could do, and re-
quired close supervision of them by dentists. However, dental hygienists are
much more like physicians' assistants than advanced practice nurses. Their
responsibilities are almost invariably determined by, and under the control
of, a dentist. Dentists are usually in independent practice, and the alloca-
tion of tasks between them and hygienists is determined entirely by them,
not by an organization that employs both groups. Hygienists are generally
not in a position to establish an independent practice, or to be reimbursed
directly rather than through a dentist, and do not perform any of the core
functions of a dentist. Thus regulations that are restrictive toward hygienists
will simply reduce their productivity, and will be re°ected in a lower wage.
18IV. Summary and Conclusion
Estimates from CPS data indicate that earnings of APNs are substantially
lower, and those of physicians' assistants are substantially higher, in States
where APNs have attained a high level of professional independence. This
suggests that when APNs have achieved substantial independence, physicians
have responded by hiring fewer APNs and more physicians' assistants. This
shift in demand may be derived from a concern on the part of primary care
physicians that some of their work responsibilities will be reassigned to APNs,
or that they are likely to encounter arrangements whereby APNs receive their
compensation directly, rather than through a supervising physician.
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